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need not meet the traditional requirements of the term as it applies to
police searches. As indicated by the minority, the significance lies in the
effect of such a ruling more so than its rationale. For by the majority's
insistence upon the formal requirements of the Fourth Amendment, tem-
pered by their realization of the necessity of the inspections involved here,
the substantive guarantees of the Fourth Amendment may necessarily be
attenuated. The net effect of a standard of "reasonableness" and "prob-
able cause" as created by the majority may relax or compromise any
effective protection against unreasonable searches afforded by the Fourth
Amendment; for what judicial officer will refuse to acquiesce in the
allegations that "probable cause" exists to issue a warrant for an area
municipal health or safety inspection under such a standard.
John M. Campfield
CRIMINAL LAw-RIGHT TO COUNSEL-The Pennsylvania Superior Court
more explicitly defines an understandingly and intelligently made waiver
of counsel by an accused.
Commonwealth ex rel. Mullins v. Maroney, 209 Pa. Super. 270, 228
A.2d 1 (1967).'
Relator was one of three men accused of armed robbery in Pennsylvania.
He was arrested in Ohio, where he fought extradition, utilizing the ser-
vices of an Ohio attorney. Unsuccessful, he was returned to Pennsylvania
where he pleaded guilty to the charges and was sentenced. Relator then
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus alleging deprivation of counsel.
In the court below, it was decided that relator had not intelligently waived
counsel, and a new trial was granted. The Commonwealth appealed, and
the superior court, in reversing the decision of the lower court and dis-
missing the petition of habeas corpus, held that the defendant did not
sustain his burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that
the waiver was not understandingly and knowingly made by him.
A fundamental concept in our legal system has been a defendant's right
to counsel. The Bill of Rights is clear on this issue, stating that "In all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defense." 2 In the landmark United States
1. This decision is pending allocature to the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Under the
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure, all criminal appeals, with the exception of capital
cases, have their final appeal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court. Counsel for the relator,
Edward Klett, Esq., is filing for allocature in the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, claiming that
the defendant was deprived of his rights under the Pennsylvania and United States Con-
stitutions. If unsuccessful on appeal or allocature, relator will appeal to the United States
Supreme Court on similar grounds.
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
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Supreme Court decision of Gideon v. Wainwright, Justice Black stated,
"in our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled into court,
. . . cannot be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him."'
The Gideon decision was followed by others which defined the rights
of all accused persons, both in state and federal prosecutions. The con-
sensus of all of these decisions was that the assistance of counsel is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, and that
the appointment of counsel is essential to a fair trial.' However, the
United States Supreme Court has also decided that counsel need not be
forced upon a defendant, and that, under appropriate circumstances, he
may waive his right to be so represented. 5
Problems may easily be seen in the interpretation of what is meant by
'"appropriate circumstances" and "waived." Most of the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court seem to follow the general rule that for the
waiver to be valid and effective, it must be the competent and intelligent
act of the accused.6 The problems are: (1) how shall this waiver be made;
(2) who shall determine its validity; and (3) what criteria should be
used in making the determination.
In the present case, Judge Jacobs used the McCray v. Rundle rule,7
which states that to be effective, a waiver of counsel must be the compe-
tent and intelligent act of the accused, a matter to be determined by all
of the facts and circumstances of the particular case, including the
accused's background and conduct. Utilizing this test, the court accepted
the rationale of the trial judge in his decision that the accused did waive
his right to counsel, as the trial judge is charged with the exacting duty
of determining whether the accused has intelligently and understandingly
made his decision to stand trial without the assistance of an attorney.
In making this determination, the judge must do more than ask a few
cursory questions; he must delve as far as possible into the mind of the
defendant to learn whether he knowledgeably waived his right.' The trial
judge must consider, among other things, education, age, mental con-
dition,9 and the accused's apprehension of the nature of the charges and
the possible defenses thereto.'"
3. 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
4. United States ex rel. Slebodnik v. Pennsylvania, 343 F.2d 605 (3rd Cir. 1965);
Commonwealth ex rel. Craig v. Banmiller, 410 Pa. 584, 189 A.2d 875 (1963).
5. Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946).
6. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938); Moore v. Michigan, 335 U.S. 155 (1957).
7. 415 Pa. 65, 202 A.2d 303 (1964). This rule was used in the determination of whether
there was an effective waiver in all cases cited in note 14, infra.
8. United States ex rel. Colwell v. Rundle, 251 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
9. Commonwealth ex rel. Fletcher v. Cavell, 207 Pa. Super. 17, 214 A.2d 810 (1965).
10. See Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415 Pa. 65, 202 A.2d 303 (1964).
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The trial judge in this case reasoned that although the accused had
only reached the fourth grade, he still was of average intelligence, since
he dropped out of school to go to work and not for academic reasons. The
accused was 32 years of age, had been in many criminal prosecutions
before, and had enlisted the aid of an Ohio attorney to aid him in fight-
ing extradition to Pennsylvania at the time of his arrest.
A trial judge should not lightly assume that an accused has waived this
fundamental right," and only after a sufficiently penetrating and com-
prehensive examination can a judge be assured that an accused's waiver
of counsel was intelligent and understanding. 2 In the instant case a
majority of the superior court was certain that the following testimony,
considering the accused's age, background and intelligence, showed an
effective waiver:
"Questions by the Court:
"Q. Your name is Richard Mullins?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Where do you live?
"A. Marion, Ohio.
"Q. Do you have an attorney?
"A. No, sir, I haven't.
"Q. Do you want one?
"A. No, I don't.
"Q. You have a right to have counsel here before you appear before
the court, you understand that, do you?
"A. Yes, sir. M
3
11. United States ex rel. Colwell v. Rundle, 251 F. Supp. 118 (E.D. Pa. 1966).
12. Commonwealth ex rel. Fletcher v. Cavell, 207 Pa. Super. 17, 214 A.2d 810 (1965).
13. 209 Pa. Super. at 274, 228 A.2d at 3. Under similar questioning, some courts have
held a waiver to be effective while others have not. The following examples will serve to show
the confused state of the law on the issue of waiver.
Waiver was held to be effective in: Commonwealth ex rel. Johnson v. Myers, 419 Pa.
155, 213 A.2d 359 (1965); Commonwealth ex rel. McDonald v. Rundle, 202 Pa. Super.
594, 198 A.2d 324 (1964) ; and Commonwealth v. Coxle, 415 Pa. 379, 203 A.2d 782 (1964).
The McDonald case at 595 of 202 Pa. Super. and at 325 of 198 A.2d presents an interesting
waiver, inasmuch as there was never a direct question as to whether or not the accused
wanted the court to appoint counsel for him:
The Court: "Mr. McDonald, what is your situation?"
Defendant McDonald: "I don't want a lawyer."
The Court: "Do you understand the nature of the charges against you?"
Defendant McDonald: "Yes, sir."
The Court: "Robbery?"
Defendant McDonald: "Yes, sir."
The Court: "Then I understand from you that you do not want a lawyer."
Defendant McDonald: "Yes, sir."
On the other hand, waiver was held to be invalid in Commonwealth ex rel. O'Lock v. Rundle,
415 Pa. 515, 204 A.2d 439 (1964); and in Commonwealth ex rel. McCray v. Rundle, 415
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Once a trial judge has decided that an accused has effectively waived
his right to counsel, the defendant must then show by a preponderance
of the evidence that his waiver was not understandingly and intelligently
made. 4 In the present case, the relator argued first that because of his
lack of formal education he did not understandingly and knowingly waive
this right. This argument has been discussed above, with the conclusion
that in addition to formal education, factors such as intelligence and past
relationships with the courts are also to be considered; thus, the court
dismissed this argument. Relator's second argument was that he was not
told that the services of the attorney who would be appointed for him if
he so desired would be at no cost to him. The Court disposed of this by
taking notice of relator's past history with appointed counsel. However,
this very issue could easily become quite troublesome in the future. It is
incumbent upon a court to fully advise accused before accepting his waiver
of counsel. 5 The question remains, what does fully mean? In the present
case there was evidence to show that relator was told that an appointed
attorney would be free of charge,' 6 but conceivably there will be situa-
tions where an accused will not be explicitly told that the services of an
appointed attorney will be free.
Judge Hoffman based his dissent on this very issue of whether or not
the accused was advised that he was entitled to free counsel. Judge Hoff-
man felt that the rule which calls for a shift in the burden of proof to
the defendant was applicable to only a limited number of cases, to-wit:
cases which showed a clear offer and rejection of free, court-appointed
counsel on the record. Since Judge Hoffman was of the opinion that relator
was not clearly offered free appointed counsel,"7 he felt that the instant
Pa. 65, 202 A.2d 303 (1964). The McCray court, in holding the waiver invalid, took a very
conservative position based on the trial testimony:
"Q. McCray, stand up. Do you have a lawyer?
A. No, sir.
Q. Can you afford a lawyer?
A. I have tried unsuccessfuly to retain counsel. I was talking to Mr. Cain. However,
since it is listed for this morning, I am willing to go along with it for trial to be disposed of,
sir.
Q. Are you willing to proceed without an attorney?
A. Yes, sir.", 415 Pa. 65, 68, 202 A.2d 303, 304 (1964).
14. Commonwealth ex rel. Wright v. Cavell, 422 Pa. 253, 220 A.2d 611 (1966). This
general rule also holds true in the Federal Courts: Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962);
Moore v. Michigan, 335 U.S. 155 (1957).
15. Commonwealth ex rel. Clinger v. Russell, 206 Pa. Super. 436, 213 A.2d 100 (1965).
16. Captain Holt, the prosecuting officer, testified that when telling relator of his rights,
he said to relator, "that if he couldn't afford an attorney that Judge Mook would appoint an
attorney for him.", 209 Pa. at 275, 228 A.2d at 5.
17. To support his position, Judge Hoffman quoted from Chief Justice Warren in
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), at 473:
In order to fully apprise a person interrogated of the extent of his rights under this
system then, it is necessary to warn him not only that he has the right to consult
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case did not fall into the area where the burden shifts to the relator.
Thus, it was his opinion that the burden should have remained with the
prosecution to show that the waiver was knowingly and understandingly
made, and that it was not on the relator to prove otherwise.
It is the opinion of this writer that considerable difficulty would be
alleviated if a form were to be prepared and given to arresting officers
as well as trial judges that would clearly explain not only the right of
an accused, but would also explain with no chance of error that free coun-
sel would be provided if the accused could not afford his own." This
would not eliminate all problems, for if the accused still wished to waive
his rights, the issue of whether he knew what he was doing would still
be present, but the factors presently used to determine this particular issue
could still be used. Most importantly, however, there would be no differ-
ences in a court's questions to an accused regarding counsel, and the issue
of whether the accused was aware of the availability of no-cost court-
appointed counsel could be eliminated from all appeals.
Michael J. Aranson
SALES-WARRANTIES-Conforming tender by adjustment or minor re-
pair-Under the Uniform Commercial Code, where the seller was denied
access and a reasonable opportunity to conform a defective tender by
adjustment or minor repair rather than by substituting new merchandise,
the buyer failed to show a breach of warranty entitling him to either new
merchandise or rescission.
Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. Ct. App. 1967).
Plaintiff Scampoli brought an action to rescind a sales contract for a color
television set with a malfunctioning color control. Plaintiff had demanded
a new set, but defendant Wilson TV Service only proffered to repair the
color malfunction. However, defendant was denied access to the set.
with an attorney, but also that if he is indigent a lawyer will be appointed to
represent him. Without this additional warning, the admonition of the right to
consult with counsel would often be understood as meaning only that he can consult
with a lawyer if he has one or has the funds to obtain one. The warning of a right
to counsel would be hollow if not couched in terms that would convey to the in-
digent-the person most often subjected to interrogation-the knowledge that he too
has a right to have counsel present .... [Only with effective and express explana-
tion to the indigent of this right can there be assurance that he was truly in a
position to exercise it.
18. The Pittsburgh Police Superintendent's Memo No. 18-66, which outlines police in-
vestigation procedures, has the following instruction: "He must also be told that he has the
right to consult with an attorney before or during police questioning, and if he does not have
the money to hire a lawyer, a lawyer will be appointed ..... " [Emphasis added.]
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